

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 ACDA-19 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 CU-04

DRC-01 /156 W

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R 041700Z DEC 73

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2824

INFO USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USDOCOSOUTH

ALL CSCE CAPITALS 067

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 6395

VIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL MBFR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: CSCE: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: ADVANCE  
NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES HIGHLIGHTS OF  
DEBATE ON CBMS SINCE NOV 26 RESUMPTION OF FORMAL  
ACTIVITY BY MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE. IN THAT PERIOD, SPAIN  
AND CYPRUS HAVE MOVED SLIGHTLY TOWARD SOVIET POSITION ON MANEUVERS/  
MOVEMENTS. IN NATO CAUCUS, ITALY HAS ANNOUNCED  
SUPPORT FOR MOVEMENTS AND BELGIUM HAS CIRCULATED  
A PROPOSED STATEMENT OF ITS NATIONAL POSITION  
WHICH SUPPORTS MILITARY ASPECTS GOING BEYOND  
PREFERRED US LIMITS. END SUMMARY

1. MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE'S SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE SINCE  
NOV. 26 HAS BECOME BERBAL DUEL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST  
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ON NOW FAMILIAR POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF ADVANCE

NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS. NEITHER SIDE EXPECTS SIGNIFICANT MOVES ON CBMS BEFORE CHRISTMAS BREAK AND BOTH ARE FILLING REMAINING TIME WITH SHARPENED REPETITIONS OF KNOWN POSITIONS.

2. SPAIN AND CYPRUS SET FORTH FURTHER POSITIONS WHICH EDGED TOWARD WARSAW PACT POSTURES IN SOME ASPECTS. THEIR STANCES MAY REFLECT NEW INTEREST BY FEW NEUTRALS IN BRIDGING EAST-WEST GAP.

3. MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT OF WEEK, HOWEVER, OCCURRED IN WINGS. ITALY ANNOUNCED AT NATO CAUCUS THAT SHE WAS NOW PREPARED TO JOIN IN SUPPORT OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS, PROVIDED QUALIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED WHICH WOULD EXEMPT INTERNAL MOVEMENTS OF ITALIAN UNITS. ITALIAN REP EXPLAINED TO US PRIVATELY THAT ITALY HAS LONG-STANDING PROBLEM WITH NEIGHBORS OVER MOVEMENTS OF MILITARY UNITS, BUT RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH RIOTS MAKES IT ESSENTIAL THAT ITALIAN UNITS NOT BE HINDERED FROM MOVING RAPIDLY TO COPE WITH DOMESTIC DISORDERS. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, ITALIAN REP SAID HE THOUGHT NATO BRUSSELS INFORMED OF SWITCH IN POSITION.

4. BELGIAN REP INTRODUCED INTO CAUCUS DRAFT PAPER ON BELGIAN NATIONAL POSITION ON CBMS (USNATO 5743). REP STATED BELGIANS WOULD CIRCULATE PAPER IN NATO BEFORE UNDERTAKING TO TABLE IT IN SUBCOMMITTEE BEFORE CHRISTMAS BREAK. WE POINTED OUT US RESERVATIONS ON VARIOUS POINTS TREATED IN PAPER, STRESSED IT COULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS CONSENSUS OF ALLIED VIEWS. AND COUGHT TO CHANGE OR AT LEAST SOFTEN ASPECTS WHICH CONFLICTED WITH OUR VIEWS. FINAL VERSION IS NOT YET READY.

5. FOLLOWING PARAS HIGHLIGHT COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS TOUCHED ON IN FIVE SESSIONS OF CBMS.

6. SIZE: THE SOVIETS QUESTIONED AIMS OF THOSE WHO SOUGHT TO LOWER THRESHOLD OF NOTIFICATION TO ONE DIVISION. STRESSING NEED FOR APPRECIATION OF WHAT IS PRACTICAL, CONFIDENTIAL

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USSR, SUPPORTED BY PACT ALLIES, ASSERTED ANXIETY STEMMED FROM ACTIVITIES OF SEVERAL DIVISIONS, NOT ONE. SOVIETS ARGUED ONE DIVISION COULD NOT START WAR. SOVIET AMB. MENDELEVICH DISMISSED AS ABSTRACT NETHERLANDS REP'S QUESTION AS TO HOW MANY MANEUVERS OF THESE DIMENSIONS OCCURE ANNUALLY. SOVIETS REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO SUSPICION THAT PROMOTERS OF "ALL EUROPE" CONCEPT COMPLAINED THAT NOTIFICATION OF "ALL" MANEUVERS WOULD NOT FACILITATE

DETENTE BUT RAISE QUESTIONS. ALLIES AND MOST NEUTRALS, IN TURN, STRESSED ONE DIVISION AS APPROPRIATE LEVEL. SPANISH REP HOWEVER EDGED TOWARD SOVIET POSITION, CAUTIONING AGAINST TWO POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF ENGAGING IN EFFORTS TO MISUSE MEASURES FOR SECURITY PURPOSES AND TRANSFERRING INFORMATION IN "IMPRUDENT" MANNER WHICH WOULD RAISE ALARM. SPANISH REP PLUMPED FOR GLOBAL APPROACH ARGUING THAT ARMED FORCES, PER SE, MIGHT BE INCLUDED BUT ACCEPTED FACT THAT AGREEMENT ON NAVAL FORCES MIGHT BE BEYOND CAPACITY OF THIS CONFERENCE. HE NOTED DIFFERENCES IN SIZE OF DIVISIONS IN VARIOUS ARMIES, AND SUGGESTED CRITERIA BASED ON SPECIFIC NUMBER RATHER THAN UNIT. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST TOO MUCH DETAIL IN CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. CYPRUS ALSO SEEMED TO MOVE SLIGHTLY CLOSER TO SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARGUE FOR INCLUSION AIR, LAND, NAVAL FORCES, ESPECIALLY PARATROOPERS.

8. AREA. IN NOW TYPICAL TACTIC, AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH RHETORICALLY ASKED HOW MANEUVERS IN FINLAND COULD CAUSE CONCERN IN SPAIN, OR IRISH BOTHER BULGARIANS; IT IS AREAS NEAR FRONTIERS THAT COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. SOVIETS ENVISAGED AREAS ALONG ALL FRONTIER OF EQUAL DEPTH WHICH MUST BE AGREED IN THIS CONFERENCE. SPANISH BOWED SLIGHTLY TO SOVIETS AND THOUGHT PARTICIPANTS COULD STUDY CONCEPT OF NOTIFICATION OF NEIGHBOR COUNTRIES AND THEN MOVE ON TO SPECIFIC AREAS, ESPECIALLY FOR AIR MANEUVERS. HE ADVOCATED CONSIDERATION OF "ZONES OF CONFIDENCE". CYPRIOT RESERVED ON CONCEPT OF FRONTIER ZONES, ALTHOUGH HE FELT IT MIGHT BE PRESCRIBED FOR DIVISION-SIZE MANEUVERS OF ORDINARY LAND FORCES, BUT NOT SPECIAL FORCES. ALL NATO ALLIES WHO SPOKE OPPOSED FRONTIER AREAS.

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9. LENGTH OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION. SOVIETS SAW AID OF CONFERENCE AS WORKING OUT MINIMUM RATHER THAN MAXIMUM PERIOD FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. POSTULATING THAT 24 HOURS INSUFFICIENT AND ONE OR TWO MONTHS TOO LONG, SOVIETS ENDORSED 5 OR 6 DAYS AS ADEQUATE TO MEET PRACTICAL NEEDS, INCLUDING INVITATIONS TO OBSERVERS. FREQUENT THEME WAS ARGUMENT THAT ONE COULD NOT DO EVERYTHING AT ONCE, AND THAT FIRST MEASURES ACHIEVED THROUGH CSCE WOULD HELP PARTICIPANTS CLARIFY POSSIBILITIES. SPAIN AND CYPRUS SUPPORTED ONE MONTH OR MORE. ALLIES CONTINUED TO ARGUE FOR 60 DAYS. BASSIN

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